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Abstract New wireless access markets have emerged that are larger, more heterogeneous and diverse. Modelling such
markets can be challenging due to the interplay of various business- and network-related aspects as well as the interdepen-
dencies among different entities (e.g., customers, providers). Existing models of wireless markets are either microscopic,
focusing on a specific technical aspect (e.g., protocol, network topology, technology) at a fine scale or macroscopic mod-
elling wireless markets at a large-scale, e.g., considering homogeneous user populations. In contrast to these approaches,
this work develops a multi-layer game-theoretical framework, which allows providers to model users at multiple levels of
detail by considering a different number of user sub-populations. It also models the mobility pattern, traffic demand, and
networks of providers. A population game using Logit dynamics models the user selection of the appropriate dataplan and
provider, capturing the diversity in customer profile and relaxing the assumption about the user rationality. It analytically
computes the equilibriums of users and providers and numerically evaluates the performance of the market as a function
of the traffic demand, the number of available dataplans, and the knowledge about customer population. Significant ben-
efits in revenue can be achieved by a provider when it integrates more detailed information about the user population.
The number of disconnected users also decreases. Moreover the availability of several dataplans further enhances the
gains. The stronger the provider, the more prominent the benefits. However the benefits diminish when all the providers
model the customer population at the same degree of detail due to an increased competition. The analysis highlights the
development of different strategies of the providers depending on their capacity, level of knowledge about the customer
population, and traffic conditions. It illustrates how a provider changes its strategy under different conditions, focusing
potentially on different customer segments and also the pressure introduced by specific customer types.
1 Introduction
The wireless markets have experienced drastic changes and expansion, becoming more diverse (e.g.,
in terms of customer profiles, services, providers), more complex and dynamic. The virtualization, in-
creased mobile traffic, cloud infrastructures, and OTT applications have been changing the landscape.
The telecom industry is at a crossroads, facing competitive challenges, such as the decline of legacy
services (e.g., voice and SMS have been rapidly supplanted by OTT applications), increased WiFi
access, OTT competition, and saturation, that further enhances the competitive pricing pressure [2].
Pricing can be used to regulate the user behaviour, manage the network resources, while optimizing
the Quality of Service (QoS) and revenue, especially as the demand may exceed the capacity. There-
fore the design of appropriate pricing plans is important: high prices may result in high churn, while
low prices may substantially increase the number of subscribers, which may result in congestion and
customer dissatisfaction. A good balance between user requirements and profit can be achieved by
the identification of optimal plans. For that, various economic and technical aspects that affect the
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customer and provider decision making need to be modelled. Providers have applied various data-
mining algorithms to identify the different market segments (e.g., [36, 15, 45, 21]). How does the
knowledge about the different market segments impact the churn and the profit? How do providers
develop their strategies and how do they change them to face the traffic increase and improve their
profit? How does a weak provider “survive” in the presence of stronger providers? How do the
different market segments influence the market? Such questions can be answered using game-theory.
In general the game-theoretical modelling of wireless markets is performed either at a micro-
scopic or at a macroscopic level: Microscopic approaches usually focus on specific technical as-
pects (e.g., protocol, network topology, technology) on a short spatial and temporal scale, often
considering networks with a small number of base stations (BSs) and markets with a single provider
[11, 24, 44, 14, 46, 13, 48]. The computational and scalability issues when analysing large (e.g.,
nation-wide) markets become prominent. On the other hand, macroscopic approaches model large-
scale markets using homogeneous populations [17, 29, 30, 27, 16] and a simplified version of the
network infrastructure [43, 47] to make the analysis tractable. Such macroscopic approaches allevi-
ate the computational issues but at the expense of accuracy, since they do not consider the diversity
in the customer population. Unlike these approaches, this work develops a multi-layer two-stage
game-theoretical framework that allows providers to model users at multiple levels of detail based
on their profile. Our objective is twofold: to answer the aforementioned questions and address the
computational-accuracy trade-off.
The competition of providers is modelled as a normal-form game, in which providers strategi-
cally select their prices to optimize their revenue. The framework models in detail the network of
several providers, each offering multiple pricing plans to their customers. The plans are data-oriented
(with prices based on data caps) and the focus is on wireless data traffic, as in most telecom markets
currently. The framework captures important aspects of the customer behaviour, including their pref-
erences and loyalty, traffic demand, mobility pattern (e.g., session arrival process, handovers), and
QoS metrics. It identifies market segments (i.e., user sub-populations) based on their willingness-
to-pay, datarate, and traffic demand, and model their decision making separately. Examples of such
choice strategies consumers may use, especially when price is better known than quality, are the best
value, price-seeking, and price aversion [39]. A population game models the user decision-making
process. Via the Logit dynamics, a user decides to become subscriber of a certain provider or remain
disconnected.
Based on this modelling framework, we analysed the benefits of integrating information about the
market segments (e.g., consumer profiles) in different levels of detail (i.e., multi-layer aspect). The
evaluation focuses on the revenue of providers and percentage of disconnected users, as a function
of the level of detail, number of dataplans, and traffic demand. Significant benefits in revenue can
be achieved by a provider when it integrates more detailed information about the user population.
The number of disconnected users also decreases. Moreover the availability of several dataplans
further enhances the gains. The stronger the provider, the more prominent the benefits. However
the benefits diminish when all the providers model the population at the same degree of detail, due
to an increased competition. The analysis highlights the development of different strategies of the
providers depending on their capacity, level of knowledge about the customer population, and traffic
conditions. It illustrates how a provider changes its strategy under different conditions, focusing
potentially on different customer segments and also the pressure introduced by specific customer
types. It also shows how the weak provider reacts and “survives" the competition. With a larger
number of dataplans, providers can charge the different customer sub-populations more efficiently,
achieving higher revenue.
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This paper extends our earlier work and the state-of-the-art in the following ways: (1) It enables
providers to model users at different levels of detail and analytically computes the equilibriums of
users and providers. (2) It employs a detailed model of the network. (3) It allows providers to offer
several dataplans depending on user traffic demand and models the user-decision making, capturing
important aspects of customer behaviour. (4) It relaxes the assumption about the user rationality in
selecting providers and dataplans. The irrationality is often attributed to the subjective assessment on
the benefits and risks (as indicated by behavior economics).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our modeling framework, focusing on the
queuing network of providers, user service selection, and the competition of providers. Section 3
evaluates the performance of a wireless market when providers model users at different levels of
detail. Section 4 discusses the related work. Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions and future
work plan.
2 Modeling framework
Economic and technical aspects affect the decision-making process of customers and of providers.
Our modelling framework consists of two layers, the technological layer and the economic one. The
technological layer models the wireless networks of providers as queueing networks and the user
traffic demand with appropriate stochastic processes. It also estimates the QoS of providers based
on the average and variance of data rate. The economic layer models the interaction among a set
of providers and a heterogeneous user population. Each provider offers different dataplans to users
that produce different traffic demand and selects their prices aiming to maximize its revenue, while
each user selects a provider considering the offered prices and quality of service (QoS) guarantees.
The user population is divided into groups, each having different characteristics and preferences.
Throughout this paper, we use the terms users and customers interchangeably (similarly for the terms
group and segment). Given the growth of LTE networks, the rapid increase of the WiFi mobile traffic
(expected to consitute more than 46 percent of mobile data[6]), the evolution of the IP networks,
and the decline of the voice and sms, we focus here on data (downlink) transmission and monthly
dataplans.
A two-stage game defines the interaction of users and providers. The first stage instantiates the
competition of providers and the second one the user-decision making. A population game models
the user decisions: members of each user group could either select to become subscribers of a certain
provider or remain disconnected. The decisions of these users are modeled by the Logit dynamics,
a system of ordinary differential equations. They are based on a utility function that depends on the
price and QoS and a noise parameter that defines how much trust users place on this utility function,
capturing the user “irrationality” and “stickiness” to a provider. On the other hand, the competition
of providers is modeled as a normal-form game in which providers strategically select their prices
to optimize their revenue. The utility functions of providers depend on the offered prices and the
equilibrium of users (Fig. 1). Our framework models a wireless access market of I providers and
a user population of J groups. Each provider has deployed a network of wireless BSs and offers
long-term subscriptions, which are best-effort data services. The following subsections describe the
components of our modeling framework in more detail.
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Figure 1: Overview of the main components of the framework: network of providers, market seg-
mentation, traffic, customer selection, and pricing strategy of providers.
Table 1: Queueing-theoretical parameters for users of group j when connected at the network
of provider i
Parameter Description
Ki Number of BSs of the provider i
λ j Total session generation rate
z ji(z j0) Ratio of subscribers (disconnected users)
ω
j
ik Steady-state probability for a user of group j to be located within the coverage of BS k
vik Departure rate from BS k due to handover
µik Session service rate at BS k
dik Total departure rate from BS k (dik = vik + µik)
p( j)∗i,m,k Conditional prob. of handover from BS m to BS k given that a handover occurs
p( j)i,m,k Unconditional prob. of handover from BS m to BS k
(
p( j)i,m,k = vim p
( j)∗
i,m,k/dim
)
γ
j
ik Total session arrival rate at BS k
a jik Arrival rate of new sessions at BS k
ρ
j
ik Traffic intensity at BS k
ni Vector indicating the number of users at each BS
Qi(ni) Stationary distribution of number of users at BSs
Bik Bandwidth at BS k
R ji(z) Average data rate
V ji(z) Variance of data rate
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2.1 The queueing networks of providers
Each provider (e.g., provider i) has deployed a number of BSs (Ki) covering a geographical region
(e.g., a city). We assume that in all BSs, the available bandwidth is shared equally among connected
users, i.e., processor-sharing discipline. 1. Users generate requests to connect to a base station (BS)
to start a session. During a session, a user transmits and receives data via that BS. The session
generation of a group of users j follows a Poisson process with a total rate of λ j. This rate is allocated
across providers according to the probability vector z j = (z j0, z j1, ..., z jI). The ratio of members of the
group j that select the provider i is indicated by z ji, while z j0 indicates the ratio of members of that
group that select the disconnection. The vector z = (z1, ..., zJ) corresponds to the probability vector of
each user group and shows how the entire user population is divided among the available providers
and disconnection state.
The mobility of members of the group j in the network of a provider is modeled with a Markov-
chain in which a state corresponds to the coverage area of a BS. The total session generation rate of
the members of the group j that select the provider i is further divided among its BSs (k = 1, ...,Ki)
according to the probabilities ω jik. These probabilities correspond to the stationary distribution of the
Markov chain modeling the user mobility. Note that the handovers at a BS k of the provider i are
modeled with a Poisson process of total rate vik. This rate is estimated according to the fluid flow
mobility model [34]. We also assume that handovers are performed in a seamless manner. Table 1
defines the queueing-theoretical parameters for the members of the group j when connected at the
network of the provider i. Let us now focus on a simple case in which all users select the provider
i (i.e., z ji = 1 for all j = 1, ..., J). The total session arrival rate at a BS k from members of the
group j (γ jik) consists of the new sessions (a
j
ik = ω
j
ikλ j) and handover sessions from neighbouring BSs
(Fig.2a):
γ
j
ik = a
j
ik +
Ki∑
m=1
γ
j
im p
( j)
i,m,k (1)
The traffic intensity generated by the users of the group j at the BS k of the provider i (ρ jik) is equal to
the ratio of the total session arrival rate at the BS k from members of the group j (γ jik) over the total
session departure rate at that BS (dik). However, to characterize the performance of the network of the
provider i, the total traffic intensity introduced by all user groups at each BS needs to be estimated.
By summing the Eq. 1 over all user groups, we derive the traffic equations for the network of the
provider i:
J∑
j=1
γ
j
ik =
J∑
j=1
a jik +
Ki∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
γ
j
im p
( j)
i,m,k (2)
We now define the total session arrival rate at the BS k of the provider i from all user groups γik =∑J
j=1 γ
j
ik, the total arrival rate of new sessions at the BS k of the provider i aik =
∑J
j=1 a
j
ik, and the
average unconditional probability of a handover from the BS m to the BS k over all user groups
pi,m,k =
∑J
j=1 γ
j
im p
( j)
i,m,k/γim. The corresponding average conditional probability of a handover from the
BS m to the BS k given that a handover occurs is defined as p∗i,m,k = pi,m,kdim/vim Then, the traffic
equations can be rewritten as in Eq. 3:
γik = aik +
Ki∑
m=1
γim pi,m,k (3)
1Various scheduling algorithms that perform a long-term proportional fair channel allocation have been proposed in
the context of LTE networks [5, 19]Similarly, the IEEE 802.11 achieves a long-term fair bandwidth allocation.
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The queueing network of the provider i is modeled as a Markov chain. Each state corresponds to
a vector ni = (ni1, ..., niKi) indicating the number of connected users at all BSs. State transitions
correspond to various types of events including session arrivals, terminations, and handovers. The
stationary distribution of the Markov chain is estimated by solving the global-balance equations.
Such equations set the arrival rate at each state of the Markov chain equal to the departure rate from
that state. Due to the Markovian property and the processor-sharing discipline of our system, the
global-balance equations can be simplified into a set of local-balance equations [3]. Unlike global-
balance equations, local-balance equations focus on the session arrivals and departures at specific
BSs. According to these equations (Eqs. 4), the rate leaving a state ni due to the departure of a user at
a specific BS k is equal to the rate entering that state due to the arrival of a user at the BS k either due
to a new session or a handover (Eq. 4a). Furthermore, the rate leaving the state ni due to the arrival
of a new session at a BS is equal to the rate entering that state due to the termination of a session at a
BS (Eq. 4b).
dikQi(ni) = aikQi(ni − eik) +
Ki∑
m=1
vim p∗i,m,kQi(ni − eik + eim) (4a)
Ki∑
k=1
aikQi(ni) =
Ki∑
k=1
µikQi(ni + eik) (4b)
In Eqs. 4, eik is a vector with all entries equal to 0 except the k-th entry which is equal to 1. Fig. 2b
illustrates the local-balance equations for a network of two BSs. Given that ρik =
∑J
j=1 ρ
j
ik < 1 for
each BS of the provider i, the stationary distribution of the number of connected users at all BSs can
be derived as follows:
Qi(ni) =
Ki∏
k=1
(1 − ρik) (ρik)nik (5)
By substituting Eq. 5 in the local-balance equations (Eqs. 4) and using simple algebra, we derive the
traffic equations (Eq. 3). This proves the validity of Eq. 5. Given that the stationary distribution is
in product form, each BS can be viewed as an independent M/M/1 queue with the processor-sharing
discipline.
In the general case in which not all users select the provider i (i.e., z ji < 1), we can replace
γ
j
ik, a
j
ik, and ρ
j
ik with z jiγ
j
ik, z jia
j
ik, and z jiρ
j
ik, respectively and Eqs. 1-5 still hold. In this case, the
average number of connected users at the BS k of the provider i is E[Nik] =
ρik
1−ρik =
∑J
j=1 z jiρ
j
ik
1−∑Jj=1 z jiρ jik [23],
where ρik is the traffic intensity introduced by all user groups (ρik =
∑J
j=1 z jiρ
j
ik). When a new user
arrives at the BS k, it shares the available bandwidth along with all other currently connected users
at that BS. Therefore, the amount of bandwidth that a new user gets when it connects to the BS k is
Bik
E[Nik]+1
= Bik(1 − ∑Jj=1 z jiρ jik), where Bik is the total bandwidth of that BS. The average data rate as
perceived by a user of the group j at the network of the provider i can be computed as the weighted
average of the data rate achieved at each BS (Eq. 6):
R ji(z) =
Ki∑
k=1
ω
j
ikBik(1 −
J∑
l=1
zliρlik) (6)
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Figure 2: Session arrivals at a BS of the provider i from members of the group j (left). The local-
balance equations for a network with two BSs (right).
The spatial variability of data rate affects the QoS. Thus, the utility function of the members of the
group j (Eq. 8) incorporates the average data rate (Eq. 6) and variance of data rate which is defined
as a polynomial of second degree with respect to z (Eq. 7):
V ji(z) =
Ki∑
k=1
ω
j
ik
Bik(1 − J∑
l=1
zliρlik) − R ji(z)
2 (7)
The user service selection process employs the average and variance of data rate. The sub-games
modeling the user service selection and competition of providers are described in Subsections 2.2
and 2.3, respectively.
2.2 User service selection
The user service selection process is modeled by a population game. Each member of a user group
can choose among I + 1 available strategies H = {0, 1, ..., I}. Strategies 1, 2, ..., I correspond to
subscriptions with the providers 1, 2, ..., I, respectively, while strategy 0 denotes the disconnection
state. We assume that each group corresponds to a homogeneous sub-population, and as such, the
utility attained when selecting a specific strategy is the same for all users in that group. Therefore, it
suffices to describe the service selection of the members of the group j with a probability distribution
over the set of strategies (H). This distribution z j = (z j0, z j1, ..., z jI) is the strategy profile of the group
j indicating how members of this group are divided among the different strategies (subscriptions and
disconnection). The strategy profile of the entire user population consists of the strategy profiles of
all groups (z = (z1, ..., zJ)). Additionally, the market share that corresponds to a strategy i is the
average percentage of customers over all user groups that select this strategy, i.e., zi =
∑J
j=1 z jiN j/N.
All parameters of a wireless market are defined in Table 2.
Utility function of the group j. A user from the group j selects a strategy (i.e., a subscription or
disconnection) based on the average and spatial variance of the achievable data rate at the networks
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Table 2: Main parameters of a wireless market
Parameter Description
I Number of providers
J Number of user groups
N j Number of users in group j
N Total number of users
c Vector with the prices of all providers
H User strategies
f j
(
R ji(z)
)
Impact of average data rate on utility function of group j
w jV (w
j
P) Weight of variance of data rate (price) for users of group j
u ji (z; c) Utility function of group j
d j Average monthly traffic demand in MB of a member of group j
z(t) User strategy profile at time t
z∗(c) Equilibrium of users when price vector is c
P Providers
C Provider strategy profiles
σi(c) Utility function of provider i
of providers and the offered prices:
u ji(z; c) =
 f j
(
R ji(z)
)
− w jVV ji(z) − w jPci(d j) if i = 1, ..., I
0 if i = 0
(8)
The function f j is concave, strictly increasing, and non-negative and defines the impact of the average
data rate (R ji(z)) on the utility of the members of the group j. Such functions have been frequently
used in the literature (e.g., [12, 20]). In the analysis, we assume that f j is exponential, i.e., f j(x) =
w jR(τ j − exp(−h jx)). Its main characteristic is that it defines a diminishing return for users when the
QoS improves2. The parameter w jR expresses the willingness to pay of the members of the group j.
The larger the w jR, the larger the maximum price that users from the group j can pay. The parameter
h j defines the sensitivity of the members of the group j to low data rate. The larger the h j, the larger
the tolerance of users to a low data rate. The impact of the variance of data rate (V ji(z)) and price of
the subscription of the provider i (ci(d j)) is assumed to be linear and their significance is indicated by
the positive weights w jV and w
j
P, respectively. The price that the members of the group j pay when
selecting the subscription with the provider i depends on the average traffic demand they produce in
a period of a month (d j) according to Eq. 9:
ci(d j) =

ci1 if 0 < d j ≤ D1
ci2 if D1 < d j ≤ D2
...
ciS i if DS i−1 < d j ≤ DS i
(9)
Dataplans. Most of the operators employ pricing strategies based on the data instead of talk time
or text, in response to the changes in the usage patterns (e.g., [31]). The provider i offers S i distinct
2Other utility functions, e.g., logarithmic and isoelastic ones, could be also employed.
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dataplans each for different traffic demand levels. Depending on which interval the traffic demand of
a user lies, that user pays a different price. In other words, the provider i charges each user with a
flat rate that depends on its level of traffic demand according to Eq. 9. We assume that each user is
aware of its own average traffic demand per month when selecting a service 3. Furthermore, when a
user selects the disconnection (i.e., i = 0), it attains utility equal to 0. The parameters of the utility
function u ji (i.e., w
j
R, τ j, h j, w
j
V , w
j
P and d j) constitute the profile of the members of the group j.
Evolution of user-decision making. Based on the utility functions of all user groups, the evolu-
tion of the strategy profile of users (z(t)) is described by the Logit dynamics, a system of ordinary
differential equations (Eq. 10). Compared to other population dynamics, the Logit dynamics have
two attractive properties: (1) They can capture the user bounded rationality and stickiness/loyalty to
certain providers. (2) They are innovative dynamics.
dz ji(t)
dt
=
r
1 +
∑
k,i exp
(u jk(z(t))−u ji(z(t))

) − rz ji(t) (10)
Note that we assume that the evolution of the user decisions manifests at a much slower time scale
compared to the time scale at which sessions arrive and depart at the BSs of a provider. Specifically,
the session arrivals and departures are performed at a time scale of minutes, while the user decisions
manifest at a time scale of days or even months. Therefore, when the user strategy profile changes
from z to z0 over the course of several days, there is enough time for the queueing network of a
provider to reach the equilibrium. We can then assume that the average data rate changes from R ji(z)
to R ji(z0) and the spatial variance of data rate changes from V ji(z) to V ji(z0). The parameter r controls
the speed of the dynamics, while  is the noise and takes values in the interval [0,∞). When  = 0,
users are completely “rational”, i.e., always select the strategy that maximizes their utility function.
Specifically, if the strategy k has slightly larger utility than strategy i that has been selected by a
rational user, this rational user will then switch to strategy k. However, this behaviour is not realistic.
Users are reluctant to switch to another provider when the additional benefits of switching are
small. According to a survey study, users should be offered additional benefits of around 40% before
they are highly likely to change their provider [42]. Several aspects, such as, the brand name and
brand equity [38], reputation of a provider [22, 8], market share of a provider [18], length of customer
association with a provider [37], and force of habit [25], affect the user-decision making. In this work,
the noise of the Logit dynamics models the aggregate effect of those aspects. As the noise increases
from 0 towards infinity, users become “stickier” with their selected service and change provider only
when the benefits in terms of price and QoS are large enough.
To compute the equilibrium of users for a given set of prices offered by the providers, we solve
the system of the Logit dynamics (Eq. 10) using a standard ODE solver starting from an initial point
at which all user groups are uniformly distributed across the available strategies (i.e., subscriptions
with providers and disconnection). The point at which the Logit dynamics converge is the user
equilibrium.
2.3 Competition of providers
The competition of providers is modelled as a normal-form game (P,C, {σi}i∈P). In this game, each
provider (say provider i) offers S i distinct dataplans to users. The strategy of that provider ci =
3In this paper, the term ”service" refers to a subscription with a provider or the disconnection, while the term ”data-
plan" refers to the offered price of a provider for a specific interval of traffic demand. A user selects a service and pays
the price corresponding to its level of traffic demand.
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Figure 3: Effect of noise  on the utility function of a provider in a market with 5 user groups,  = 0
(left),  = 0.5 (middle), and  = 1.5 (right).
(ci1, ..., ciS i) is a vector containing the prices of all those dataplans. Each price is selected from a
closed interval [0, Cmaxi ]. The strategy space of providers is the set of all possible combinations of
prices that can be offered in the market and is a rectangle of the form C = [0, Cmax1 ]
S 1 × [0, Cmax2 ]S 2 ×
... × [0, CmaxI ]S I . Each point of the strategy space c = (c1, ..., cI) is a vector containing the offered
prices of all providers.
We assume that each provider can model the user population at different levels of detail. They
analyze customer data, e.g., demographic information as well as information about their traffic de-
mand and profile, to perform market segmentation. In the performance evaluation, we considered a
synthetic user profiles dataset (for the entire customer population) and that each provider can extract
information for a different number of market segments (user clusters), corresponding to an incom-
plete view of the market. 4 The larger the number of market segments, the more detailed information
about the user population.
Each provider, after estimating the market segments of users, it models their decision making
based on the system of Logit dynamics (Eq. 10). For each set of offered prices c, a provider solves
the system of Logit dynamics modeling the decision making of these clusters of users starting from
uniform initial conditions and computes the corresponding equilibrium point (zˆ∗(c)). Based on this
equilibrium, the utility function of the provider i is defined according to Eq. 11:
σi(c) =
S i∑
s=1
∑
j:Ds−1<d j≤Ds
N jzˆ∗ji(c)cis (11)
This function computes the sum of the revenue collected by each of the offered dataplans of the
provider i. For a dataplan s, only the payments of the clusters corresponding to this dataplan are con-
sidered (i.e., the user clusters that produce an average traffic demand lying in the interval (Ds−1,Ds]).
When a user is rational (i.e.,  = 0), it selects the provider that maximizes its utility function. Let
us assume that such a user has selected the provider i. If at a certain point the subscription of another
provider k becomes slightly more profitable compared to the subscription of the provider i, the user
will switch providers. This extreme behaviour of rational users introduces technical difficulties in the
analysis: Various discontinuities appear in the derivatives of the utility functions of providers. We
developed a methodology to analytically compute the NEs of providers under such discontinuities.
This methodology divides the strategy space of providers into various subsets called “regions” in
4Obviously the analysis can be extended considering that providers have access to different datasets of the customer
population.
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which the provider utility functions are continuously differentiable and analyses the game of providers
at each one of those regions separately. At the final step, it combines the results of the analysis from all
the regions to compute the global NEs of providers. A more detailed description of this methodology
can be found in our earlier work [9].
This modeling approach can effectively compute the NEs of providers, when users are completely
rational and providers model users at the macroscopic level (i.e., considering only 1 cluster) and offer
only 1 dataplan5. However, what happens when providers have a more rigorous knowledge about the
market segments? In such a case, the computation of the global NE becomes challenging: As the
number of user clusters increases, the number of (hyper-)surfaces at which the utility functions of
providers have discontinuous derivatives in the strategy space of providers also increases.
This issue is mainly due to the assumption of the user rationality. Rationality is a set of principles
that describes the utility maximinzing choice. Under this assumption, users can drastically change
their behaviour even under small deviations in their utility function. To more realistically model the
user behaviour, we use the Logit dynamics (Eq. 10). Among other standard population dynamics,
such as, the replicator, best response, BNN, and Smith dynamics, these are the only ones that can
model the user irrationality [35]. As explained earlier, their noise parameter () indicates how much
the user decisions deviate from the optimal ones based on their utility function capturing the effect
of other factors that influence users (e.g., psychological/social factors). In general, issues such as the
price-quality correlation, impact of objective information and personal experience on user strategy
have been examined in marketing e.g., [39].
The noise of the Logit dynamics does not only make the model of users more realistic but also
simplifies the analysis by “smoothing out” the discontinuities in the derivatives of the utility func-
tions of providers. An example of the effect of noise is shown in Fig. 3. This figure presents the
utility function of a provider (say provider 1) offering only 1 dataplan in an oligopoly with 5 distinct
user groups, when the prices of its competitors remain fixed. When the noise is equal to zero (i.e.,
 = 0), the rational behaviour of users results in various discontinuities in the derivative of the utility
function of the provider 1 (Fig. 3a). When the value of noise slightly increases (i.e.,  = 0.5), the dis-
continuities are smoothed out (Fig. 3b). If the noise increases a little further (i.e.,  = 1.5), the utility
function of the provider becomes concave. This function (Fig. 3c) does not deviate significantly from
the corresponding one when users are completely rational (Fig. 3a).
In each market case, by selecting a sufficient amount of noise, the utility functions of providers
become concave. This simplifies the estimation of a global NE significantly. One should simply set
the derivatives of the utility functions of providers with respect to their prices equal to 0:
∂σi(c)
∂cis
= 0, for all i = 1, . . . , I and s = 1, . . . , S i (12)
To compute the Nash equilibrium of providers, we solve the system of non-linear Eqs. 12 using
a standard numerical-analysis algorithm. When the utility functions of providers are concave, a
solution of the system 12 (c∗) is guaranteed to be a global NE of the game of providers. At this
point, the utility functions of providers are maximized given the prices of their competitors [4] and
therefore, no provider has the incentive to change its strategy. Our algorithm for the estimation of
a NE proceeds as follows: First the system of Eqs. 12 is solved. If a solution is reported, it will
be then verified whether or not it corresponds to a global NE (i.e., at which the utility function of
each provider is maximized given the prices of the other providers). This final verification step is
5In the worst case, the algorithm needs to solve two non-linear systems of I equations and a system of 2I non-linear
inequalities.
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Figure 4: User group distribution when w jR and h j are correlated (a) and when they are independent
(b), respectively. Distribution of user groups for independent w jR & h j (c).
necessary given that the concavity of the utility functions of providers is not always guaranteed. For
example, if the selected value of noise is not sufficiently large, the utility function of one or more
providers may not be concave. In such a case, for a point to be a Nash equilibrium, the system of
Eqs. 12 is still necessary but not sufficient. Therefore, a solution of Eqs. 12 could correspond to a
local maximum of the utility functions of providers, i.e., a “local NE” instead of a global one.
3 Performance evaluation
We implemented the modeling framework in Matlab and instantiated a wireless access market of a
small city, represented by a rectangle of 14.4 km x 12.5 km. This market includes 4 providers and
a population of 300, 000 users. Each provider has deployed a cellular network covering the entire
city. The BSs at each network are placed on the sites of a triangular grid, with a distance between
two neighbouring sites of 1.6 km. The maximum data rate with which a BS can serve sessions is 25,
22, 19, and 16 Mbps for the providers 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The provider 1 is the strongest
provider in the market with the largest capacity at its BSs (i.e., 25 Mbps), while the provider 4 is
the weakest one with the lowest capacity (i.e., 16 Mbps). The average size of a session is 10 MB.
Furthermore, the session service rate of a BS is µ1 = 18.75, µ2 = 16.50, µ3 = 14.25, and µ4 = 12.00
sessions/min for the providers 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. We also consider different cases for the
user traffic demand (i.e., an average user session generation rate from 0 up to 1.5 sessions/hour) and
analyse its impact on providers and users.
3.1 Modeling users at different levels of detail
We consider a heterogeneous user population consisting of 100 distinct groups, which represents the
most detailed picture of the user population. To model a diverse user population, we selected the
maximum willingness to pay (w jR) and tolerance on low data rate (h j) of these groups follow normal
distributions of mean 30 and 0.6 and standard deviation of 7.6 and 0.3, respectively. In real markets,
those two parameters are often correlated. For example, users with a large willingness to pay (high
w jR) usually demand a high QoS and are less tolerant on low data rate (low h j). This is due to the
fact that the service charge creates an expectation for the perceived quality. However to highlight the
impact of the correlation between the user willingness to pay and tolerance on low data rate, we also
defined a scenario in which those two parameters are independent. Specifically, in the first (main)
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Figure 5: Performance gains when providers model users at different levels of detail compared to
macroscopic modeling when w jR and h j are correlated (top) and when they are independent (bottom),
respectively.
scenario, the cross correlation of w jR and h j is equal to −0.85 (Fig. 4a). This means that users with a
large willingness to pay (high w jR) usually are less tolerant on low data rate (low h j). In the second
scenario, the cross correlation of w jR and h j is equal to 0 and the maximum willingness to pay and
data rate requirements of groups are completely independent (Fig. 4b). In both scenarios, the traffic
demand (d j) is the same for all user groups and providers offer only one dataplan. Additionally, the
weight of data rate variability (w jV) is set equal to 0 for all user groups, while the noise value ()
is set equal to 1.5. The noise parameter should reflect the user behaviour. However given the lack
of real-world datasets, the minimum value of noise that results in concave utility functions (for the
providers) was selected.
We distinguish four distinct user categories the business users, low profile users, value for-money
users, and lenient users. Business users have a high willingness to pay (i.e., high value of w jR) but
are highly sensitive on low data rate (i.e., low value of h j). Low-profile (or basic) users are the
opposite: They can not afford a high price but are more tolerant on low data rates. Value-for-money
(or best-deal) users are the most demanding ones in the market. They have a low willingness to
pay and can not tolerate low values of data rate. Finally, lenient users are characterized by a high
willingness to pay and high tolerance in low data rate. These users make their decisions considering
mainly the price, i.e., they search for the cheapest service. Such consumer classification in terms of
choice strategies is common in marketing, especially when price is better known than quaility [39].
We clustered the 100 sub-populations to the above four categories. The characteristics of these four
categories are given in Table 3.
For each scenario, we have defined different market cases in which providers model the user
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Table 3: The four main user categories
Category Willingness to Tolerance on low
pay (w jR) data rate (h j)
Business users > 50% percentile < 50% percentile
Low-profile users < 50% percentile > 50% percentile
Value-for-money users < 50% percentile < 50% percentile
Lenient users > 50% percentile > 50% percentile
population at different degrees of detail when estimating their utility functions. Each provider applies
a clustering algorithm (e.g., K-means) on the profiles of the 100 user groups and determines a set
of 5, 9, or 20 representative user clusters. Providers consider these sets of clusters when estimating
their utility functions (according to Eq. 11). As the number of clusters increases, the modeling of
the user population becomes more accurate but the computational complexity of estimating the NE
of providers increases. Our objective is to select the most appropriate level of detail that results in
large performance gains for providers at a low computational complexity. Fig. 5 shows the additional
benefits of users and providers obtained when providers model the user population at different levels
of detail compared to modeling users macroscopically (i.e., with only 1 cluster) when w jR and h j are
correlated (Figs. 5a - 5c) and when they are independent (Figs. 5d - 5f), respectively.
Case a: When the maximum willingness to pay (w jR) and tolerance on low data rate (h j) are
correlated, modeling the user population at a higher level of detail (with a larger number of clusters)
pays off for providers and users. Providers increase their revenue in almost all cases (Figs. 5b
and 5c) and the percentage of disconnected users is significantly reduced (Fig. 5a). When providers
model users at the macroscopic level, they apply a homogeneous marketing strategy by selecting their
prices considering only aggregate profiling information for the entire population, without detailed
information for the different sub-populations that reflect the diversity of the market. The provider
1 offers a price that is close to the prices of the other providers and attracts both business and low-
profile users. Additionally, the providers 3 and 4 offer relatively high prices losing customers and
revenue form the low-profile user groups. In such a market, except from the revenue of providers, the
performance of users is also sub-optimal. A large percentage of users ends up selecting the provider
1 resulting in a degradation of the offered quality of service. Furthermore, due to the relatively high
prices of the providers 3 and 4, more low-profile users become disconnected. In other words, under a
macroscopic view of the market, providers make suboptimal decisions, which have a negative impact
on their revenue and performance of users.
By employing a larger number of clusters for the estimation of their utility functions (e.g., 5, 9 or
20 clusters), providers obtain a more detailed picture of the market, and as a result, the performance
of the market improves. The provider 1 offers a higher price compared to the other providers and at-
tracts mostly business users, while its share of low-profile users drops. On the contrary, the providers
3 and 4 offer low prices and attract the largest percentage of low-profile users, while their share of
business users becomes low. The strong providers (i.e., the ones with the largest cellular capacity)
focus on users with high willingness to pay and QoS requirements, while the weak providers focus
on users with low willingness to pay and QoS requirements. This improves the overall performance
of users (Fig. 5a) and reduces the intensity of competition allowing for a higher revenue for providers
(Figs. 5b and 5c). In general, as the number of clusters increases, the performance of the market im-
proves. However, the computational complexity of computing the equilibriums of users and providers
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Figure 6: Execution time needed to perform the market analysis and additional revenue gain of a
provider at different levels of detail.
increases (e.g., a non-linear increase in the execution time as shown in Fig. 6)6.
Under high traffic demand, a large decrease of the benefits of providers is observed from a certain
point onwards (Figs. 5b and 5c). At this point, the capacity of the networks of providers is reached
and disconnected users start appearing. The first users that become disconnected are the ones with a
low willingness to pay. Providers enter a competition and restrain their prices aiming to prevent those
users from becoming disconnected. Even the provider 1 enters the competition regardless of its focus
on business users. As the traffic demand keeps increasing, it becomes less beneficial for providers to
keep those users in the market. This weakens the competition allowing for a small recovery of the
revenue gains of providers.
Case b: If the maximum willingness to pay (w jR) and tolerance on low data rate (h j) are inde-
pendent, the modeling of users at a finer level of detail is beneficial for users: The percentage of
disconnected users is significantly reduced (Fig. 5d). Interestingly, the performance of providers is
not always improved. Under a low traffic demand, providers achieve significant revenue gains, while
under large traffic demand, they lose revenue compared to a macroscopic modeling of users (Figs.
5e and 5f). Furthermore, the larger the number of clusters, the more prominent the losses. This is
a counter-intuitive result: One would expect that the larger the degree of knowledge about the user
population, the more significant the benefits of the providers. To explain this phenomenon, we should
focus on the distribution of the user groups in this scenario (shown in Fig. 4c).
We distinguish four different types of groups: the business users, low-profile users, lenient users,
and value-for-money users. The revenue losses are mainly due to the pressure that value-for-money
users and lenient users introduce in the market. Value-for-money users have a low willingness to pay
(i.e., low w jR) and small tolerance on low data rate (i.e., low h j). Satisfying the requirements of those
users can be difficult. Providers should offer services of high data rate on low prices. Under a large
traffic demand, when the capacity of the networks of providers is reached, value-for-money users
start becoming disconnected. When modeling users at high levels of detail, providers are aware of
6It is in the interest of a provider to select the appropriate number of clusters that results in high revenue and requires
a relatively low execution time, if there are time constraints (e.g., 9 clusters).
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Figure 7: Performance gains of a market in which only the provider 1 models users with 9 clusters,
while all other providers model users macroscopically compared to a market in which all providers
model users macroscopically. The top (bottom) figures correspond to a scenario in which w jR and h j
are correlated (independent), respectively.
the presence of value-for-money users and restrict their prices in an effort to attract these users given
that they correspond to a significant percentage of the market (around 25%). This results in a steep
decrease of the provider revenues (Figs. 5e and 5f). As the number of clusters increases, providers
become aware of more “extreme” cases of value-for-money users with stricter price and data rate
requirements. Therefore, they become more aggressive in the decrease of their prices, and as a result,
they lose more revenue.
In the case of high traffic demand, value-for-money users eventually become disconnected and
their influence weakens allowing for a slow recovery of the provider revenues. However, in the case
of the provider 4, its revenue gain always remains negative under large traffic demand (Fig. 5f). This
is due to the influence of lenient users. These users have a high willingness to pay (high w jR) and high
tolerance on low data rate (high h j). Price is the parameter that mainly drives their decisions. Under
a large traffic demand, disconnected users appear in the value-for-money, low-profile and business
users. However, almost all lenient users remain connected due to their low data rate requirements and
high willingness to pay. Therefore, as the traffic demand increases, the influence of lenient users in
the market intensifies. This strengthens the competition of providers keeping their revenues low.
Impact of different degrees of detail in the knowledge about customers among providers. We
repeated the analysis, considering now a market in which only the provider 1 models users with
9 clusters, while all other providers model users macroscopically. Figs. 7a, 7b, and 7c show the
differences in the prices, market share, and revenue of providers, respectively, compared to a market
in which all providers model users macroscopically when w jR and h j are correlated. Figs. 7d, 7e, and
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Figure 8: Performance gains of a market in which only the provider 4 models users with 9 clusters,
while all other providers model users macroscopically compared to a market in which all providers
model users macroscopically. The top (bottom) figures correspond to a scenario in which w jR and h j
are correlated (independent), respectively.
7f present the same differences when w jR and h j are independent.
The provider 1 always achieves revenue gains. This is observed both when w jR and h j are cor-
related and when they are independent (Figs. 7c and 7f, respectively). With its higher degree of
knowledge, the provider 1 can influence the market to its benefit outsmarting the other providers.
This is an important result which shows that the benefits of a provider from modeling the user popu-
lation in a high level of detail strongly depend on the level of knowledge of the other providers about
users.
Another interesting trend is that the effect of the knowledge of the provider 1 on the revenues of
the other providers is twofold. Under small traffic demand, the provider 1 raises its price compared
to the one offered at the macroscopic level (Figs. 7a and 7d). Given that it is the most influential
provider in the market, its price increase provides also an opportunity to the other providers to raise
their prices. This results in significant revenue gains for all providers (Figs. 7c and 7f). However,
when the traffic demand becomes large, suddenly, the provider 1 “turns against” the other providers.
When the capacity of the networks of providers is reached and disconnected users appear, it reduces
its price bellow the prices of the other providers to attract those users (Figs. 7a and 7d). Given their
macroscopic view of the market, the other providers do not react. This results in an increase of the
revenue gain of the provider 1 at the expense of the revenues of the other providers (Figs. 7c and 7f).
Let us now explain the behaviour of the provider 1 in more detail. When the user traffic demand
is low, the provider 1 realizes that it is more beneficial to focus on business users increasing its price.
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This results in a decrease of its market share compared to the one obtained at the macroscopic level
(Figs. 7b and 7e). However, this decrease of market share is useful because it improves the quality
of service of the provider 1 making its subscription more appealing to business users. Given their
improved satisfaction, those users can pay a higher price to the provider 1 increasing its revenue.
This trend persists as the traffic demand increases until the capacity of the networks of providers
is reached. From this point onwards, the quality of service drops substantially and some of the
business users become dissatisfied and decide to disconnect. Then, the provider 1 suddenly changes
its strategy. Instead of focusing on the business users, it realizes that it is more beneficial to restrict its
price in order to prevent users with low willingness to pay from becoming disconnected and attract
them to its network. Other providers do not realize this early enough due to their macroscopic view
of the market and they do not react. That way, the provider 1 achieves significant revenue gain at the
expense of the revenues of the other providers.
We repeated the previous analysis considering now that only the provider 4 models users with
9 clusters, while all other providers model users macroscopically (Fig. 8). The provider 4 achieves
revenue gains both when w jR and h j are correlated (Fig. 8c) and when they are not (Fig. 8f). Addi-
tionally, when the traffic demand is low, all providers achieve revenue gains, while under large traffic
only the provider 4 gains additional revenue at the expense of the revenues of the other providers
(Figs. 8c and 8f). However, given that the provider 4 is the weakest one in the market, its influence is
low, and therefore, the observed tends of Fig. 8 are subtler compared to Fig. 7.
3.2 Offering of multiple dataplans
We have defined a market in which users of different groups deviate not only in their willingness to
pay (w jR) and tolerance on low data rate (h j) but also in their traffic demand (d j). As in Section 3.1,
w jR and h j follow normal distributions, while the average session generation rate over all user groups
(λ =
∑J
j=1 λ j/
∑J
j=1 N j) varies from 0 up to 1.5 sessions/hour. The normalized session generation rate
n j =
λ j/N j
λ
of user groups follows a normal distribution of mean 1 and standard deviation 0.2. Some
user groups correspond to “heavy” users producing a large amount of traffic (users groups with a
large n j), while other groups correspond to “light” users (groups with a low n j). Again we distinguish
two market scenarios. In the first scenario, the cross correlation of w jR and h j is equal to −0.85, while
the cross correlation of w jR and n j is 0.85. This means that users with a large willingness to pay
(high value of w jR) usually are heavy users (high value of n j) and less tolerant on low data rate (low
value of h j). In the second scenario, the cross correlation among w
j
R, h j, and n j is equal to 0 and
the maximum willingness to pay, data rate requirements and traffic demand of groups are completely
independent. In this set of experiments, we set the noise parameter of the Logit dynamics modeling
the user-decision making () equal to 2.
We assume that a provider i offers a total number of S i dataplans each corresponding to a different
interval of traffic demand and flat-rate price. The first dataplan is ”addressed" to light users with a
normalized session generation rate up to 100/S i% percentile, while the last dataplan is appropriate to
heavy users with normalized session generation rate lying in the interval from (S i − 1) ∗ 100/S i% up
to 100% percentile. In other words, the range of the values of the normalized user session generation
rate is divided into S i segments. Users groups belonging to different segments are charged with a
different price. Providers can also model users at different levels of detail by estimating a different
number of user clusters. We have analysed a market in which providers offer 3 dataplans to users.
The performance gains obtained when providers model users at different levels of detail compared to
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Figure 9: Performance gains when providers model users at different levels of detail and offer 3
dataplans compared to modeling users macroscopically and offering 1 dataplan with w jR, h j, and n j to
be correlated (top) and independent (bottom), respectively.
when they model users macroscopically and offer only 1 dataplan are presented in Fig. 9. The top
(bottom) figures correspond to the case that w jR, h j, and n j are correlated (independent), respectively.
Similar trends are observed as in Fig. 5. When w jR, h j, and n j are correlated, in most cases,
providers achieve revenue benefits when they model users at a higher level of detail (Figs. 9b and
9c), while the reduction of the percentage of disconnected users becomes more prominent (Fig. 9a).
However, in a small interval around 0.95 session/hour, providers lose a small amount of revenue when
they model users in higher detail. When the number of user clusters increases, an increase in the
number of dataplans is required for a better pricing. With a larger number of dataplans, providers can
charge the different user clusters more efficiently achieving higher revenue. In the cases of 9 clusters
and 20 clusters, when the number of dataplans is increased above 3, the revenue losses around 0.95
sessions/hour are reduced. We omit those results due to lack of space.
When w jR, h j, and n j are independent, the observed trends are exactly the same as in Fig. 5. An
increase of the number of user clusters results in a more prominent reduction of the percentage of
disconnected users (Fig. 9d). Additionally, under a low traffic demand, an increase of the number
of clusters always results in revenue benefits for providers. However, under a large traffic demand,
modeling users with a large number of clusters results in revenue losses compared to the macroscopic
case (Figs. 9e and 9f). Again those revenue losses are due to the existence of value-for-money users
and lenient users. Those users intensify the competition of providers under a large traffic demand
resulting in lower offered prices and revenue.
We have also studied a market in which providers offer a different number of dataplans (i.e., 1,
3, or 5 dataplans). In this market, each provider models the users with 9 clusters. The performance
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gains compared to a market in which providers model users macroscopically and offer only 1 dataplan
are depicted in Fig. 10. In the top (bottom) figures the parameters w jR, h j, and n j are correlated
(independent), respectively. When w jR, h j, and n j are correlated, if providers offer only 1 dataplan,
at an interval of the traffic demand around 0.9 sessions/hour, they achieve revenue losses compared
to the macroscopic case (Figs. 10b and 10c). Those losses are mainly due to the limited number of
degrees of freedom when setting the prices of providers. Specifically, providers offer the same price
both to heavy users with a large willingness to pay and to light users with a low willingness to pay. To
prevent light users from becoming disconnected, providers restrict their prices regardless of the high
willingness to pay of heavy users losing revenue. However, when providers offer 3 or 5 dataplans,
the heavy and light users are charged with a different price. Therefore, providers are able to offer a
high price to heavy users and a low price to light users always achieving revenue benefits (Figs. 10b
and 10c).
When w jR, h j, and n j are independent, a counter intuitive result is observed. An increase in the
number of offered dataplans does not result in revenue benefits for providers. On the contrary, under
a large traffic demand, the offering of a larger number of dataplans results in revenue losses (Figs.
10e and 10f). In this case, the willingness to pay and traffic demand of user clusters are independent.
This means that the average willingness to pay of heavy and light users is almost the same. When
providers offer different dataplans to these users, their competition is intensified. Given that the
light users produce a low amount of traffic, their admission at the network of a provider does not
significantly affect its QoS. Therefore, providers have the incentive to reduce their offered prices to
light users in order to attract them to their networks entering a price war. Additionally, providers can
not charge the heavy users with a high price due to their relatively low willingness to pay (almost the
same as the one of light users). Therefore, providers would lose revenue by offering a larger number
of dataplans in this market.
4 Related work
The game-theoretical approaches in analysing wireless markets [40, 28] can be classified into two
general categories, namely, the microscopic approaches and the macroscopic ones. Microscopic
models usually focus on a short spatial and temporal scale and evaluate the impact of various technical
aspects (e.g., mobile data offloading [13, 48], femtocells [26], network selection mechanisms for
users [11, 1], cooperative spectrum access schemes for primary and secondary users in cognitive
radio networks [24, 41, 44], and multihop access paradigms [7]) on the performance of a network,
providers, and users satisfaction. These modeling approaches can be detailed and accurate but usually
not scalable or amenable to theoretical analysis. On the other hand, macroscopic approaches focus
on larger-scale phenomena and make various simplifications [17, 29, 30, 27, 16]. For example, they
may consider a homogeneous user population and model the aggregate user behaviour (e.g., traffic
demand, QoS preferences [33, 32]), trading the accuracy for scalability and tractability.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is one of the few game-theoretical ap-
proaches that models the users, network, and providers in detail. For example, it models relatively
large-scale networks (at the BS level), the user demand, profile (e.g., sensitivity to the price and QoS,
rationality and loyalty to certain providers), handovers, and mobility pattern. In our earlier work, we
developed an event-based simulator of a wireless access duopoly that could be executed at multiple
levels of detail from the microscopic to the macroscopic one [10]. However, no analytical results
were derived for the user and provider equilibriums or the offered QoS and the generalization of the
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Figure 10: Performance gains when each provider models users with 9 clusters and offers a different
number of dataplans compared to macroscopic modeling when w jR, h j, and n j are correlated (top) and
when they are independent (bottom), respectively.
framework for a larger number of providers and dataplans was difficult. Our following work pro-
vided an analytical methodology for computing the Nash equilibriums (NEs) of users and providers
in a wireless oligopoly at the macroscopic level [9]. Unfortunately its extension at higher levels of
detail was challenging due to various technical difficulties.
As mentioned in the introduction, this work extends our earlier papers and the state-of-the-art in
the following ways: (1) It enables providers to model users at different levels of detail and analytically
computes the equilibriums of users and providers. (2) It employs a detailed model of the network. (3)
It allows providers to offer several dataplans depending on user traffic demand and models the user-
decision making, capturing important aspects of customer behaviour. (4) It relaxes the assumption
about the user rationality in selecting providers and dataplans.
5 Conclusions and future work
The proposed multi-layer two-stage game-theoretical modelling framework for wireless markets dis-
tinguishes different customer groups and models their decision making process. It also models
providers with different capacities in their wireless infrastructure and degrees of knowledge about
the customer population. The providers can offer multiple dataplans. To capture the user-decision
making more realistically, the framework also models the “stickiness” to a provider.
Under a macroscopic view of the market, providers make suboptimal decisions. When providers
model the customer population in a higher detail, they can improve their revenue. Gains also exist
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when providers offer a larger number of dataplans. In the case that the customer willingness to
pay and tolerance on low data rate are independent, if providers share the same level of knowledge
about users, their competition may become more severe, resulting in revenue loss. Additionally, the
increase of the number of dataplans may also result in revenue losses due to the similar willingness to
pay of heavy and light users in such scenario. When a provider models users at a high level of detail,
its revenue strongly depends on the knowledge of the other providers about users. For example, if the
other providers also model the users in a high degree of detail, the competition may get enhanced,
resulting to revenue loss. On the other hand, when a provider models the customers at higher level of
detail compared to the others, it can achieve significant benefits. The number of disconnected users
also decreases.
The analysis shows how providers develop their strategies and how they focus on specific cus-
tomer segments. For example, often the strong provider focuses on business-type of customers,
while providers with less resources attract low-profile customers. However when the capacity of the
network is reached, the strong provider may develop a different strategy to attract users with low
willingness to pay. Moreover offering a larger number of dataplans allows providers to charge the
various customer segments more efficiently achieving a higher revenue, under the condition that the
willingness-to-pay, tolerance in data rate and traffic are not independent.
Service providers can apply such tools to assess the evolution of a market, for different customer
profile densities, dataplans, and traffic demand. The number of providers and their capacity may
also change to evaluate their impact on the market dynamics. To address the congestion, cost re-
duction, and revenue generation, operators currently are also looking for attracting allies within the
Internet market through sponsored data, offloading, infrastructure sharing, MVNOs, and network
slicing. For example, in network slicing, an infrastructure provider offers network resources, service
providers buy such resources according to the expected customer demand, and customers select the
best plan/service provider. The proposed framework can be extended to analyze the dynamics and
evolution of such new markets.
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